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COMMENTS
including heirs, legatees, and beneficiaries, are not, under the law, the real
parties in interest. Neverthelss, they have an "interest which is real." A
slackening of the rigidness of rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules, in this
respect, would aid greatly in developing a modern and just approach in
deciding cases involving nonresident administrators.
It is further suggested that the federal courts adopt and apply the
"outcome" test as described earlier. Such application would bridge the
gap between substantive and procedural law. Every state law thus con-
sidered by the federal courts could be uniformly tested.
It is logically concluded that the ultimate results of the present federal
policy, if followed, will end in large-scale removal from state courts of
the litigation of all suits wherein one of the parties, by circumstance, is a
nonresident administrator. It is further concluded that this would not be
the result if the state laws governing decedent administration were primarily
considered.
PAuL Low
VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The large number of federal procurement contracts, attended by
numerous disputes involving these contracts, and the spectre of ever-
lengthening dockets in the Federal Courts, has drawn attention to the
validity of arbitration provisions which may be placed in a procurement
contract.
The process of arbitration, as the term will be employed in this com-
ment, is to be distinguished from a process provided for by a clause contained
in many procurement contracts, which shall be termed the "determination
clause." Under the determination clause the contracting officer, subject
to review by some other government official in some instances, decides any
dispute under the contract.1
Arbitration has been defined as '... a mode of settling differences
through investigation and determination, by one or more unofficial persons
selected as a domestic tribunal for the purpose, of some disputed matter
submitted to them by contending parties for decision and award .... ,2
An arbitration proceeding is judicial in nature,3 and the parties to an
1. 41 U.SC. § 52.6 (appendix) providing for the handling of disputes; See 41
U.S.C. § 54.21, art. 12, which is the standard government supply contract disputes
provision.
2. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Henry Ericsson Co., 197 La. 732, 2 So.2d
945 (1941).
3. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Co., v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 1 Wash.
2d 401, 96 P.2d 257 (1939).
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arbitration have an absolute right to be heard and present evidence after
reasonable notice of the time and place of the hearing.4 It has been held
that the powers and duties of the contracting officer acting under a
determination clause arc not those of an arbitrator; that arbitration pro-
ceedings and the arbitrator's duties are at least of a semi-judicial character,
while the duties of the contracting officer are purely ministerial and involve
no judicial functions;5 and it has been held that such a determination
clause was included not for the purpose of finally settling disputes, but
for the purpose of preventing delay in the work.6 Again, it has been held
that the only thing which may be submitted under the determination clause
are questions of fact, and that the parties are not competent to submit
questions of the construction of the contract, or of law;7 but parties to an
arbitration may obtain a complete adiudication of their disputes.8 It seems
that a determination by the contracting officer under the determination
clause may be made without hearing, and may be based upon information
gathered ex parte, or from the officers' own experience.9 Therefore, that
although awards under determination clauses have been held to be the
same as arbitration awards in legal effect,' it is the better view to differentiate
the processes."
1I. ARBITRATION BY GOVERNMENTAL UN1s-OTIIER THAN FEPERAL
Municipal Corporations: Generally, municipal corporations may submit
to arbitration any dispute in which the corporation becomes involved.' 2
XVhile the power to insert arbitration clauses in municipal contracts has
been authorized by law in some cases,' 3 the rule seems to be that even if
not expressly authorized, arbitration is permissible in the absence of
statutory provision to the contrary.'4 The claim to be arbitrated may be
one in tort' or contract," by' 7 or against' the municipality, and the
arbitration may be statutory 9 or common law.20
4. Ibid.
5. Silas Mason Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 266, 62 S. Supp. 432, (1940).
6. Lundstrom v., United States. 53 F. Supp, 709 (D. Ore. 1941), aff'd sub. norn.
United States v. Lundstrom, 139 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1943); contra, Oltedale v. United
States, 39 F. Stpp. 998 (I). R.I. 1941).
7. Davis v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 334 (1937).
8. Brazil v. lsharn, 12 N.Y. 9 (1854).
9. Zweig v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex. 1945).
10. Cook v. Foley, 152 Fed. 41 (8th CIR. 1907), and cases cited therein at 152
Fed. 51.
11. Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373 (1871).
12. District of Columbia v. Bailcy, 171 U.S. 161 (1898); Brady v. Brooklyn, I
Barb. 854 (N.Y. 1847).
13. City of Detroit v. A. V. Kutsche & Co., 309 Mich. 700, 16 N.W.2d 128
(1944).
14. Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 II. 563 (1877); Smith v. Wilkensburg, 172 Pa.
121, 33 Atl. 371 (1895).
15. Kane v. Fond du Lac, 40 Wise. 475 (1876).
16. Brady v. Brooklyn, 1 Barb. 584 (N.Y 1847).
17. City of Marion v. Ganley, 68 Iowa 142, 26 N.W. 40 (1885).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. Cary v. Long, 181 Cal. 433, 184 Pac. 857 (1919).
20. Smith v. Wilkcnsburg, 172 Pa. 121, 33 Atl. 371 (1895).
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The rationale behind allowing the municipality to arbitrate is that
since the municipality has the power to sue and be sued, it has the power
to settle claims by arbitration.2 1 From this power is derived the power to
insert an arbitration clause in a contract which the municipality consum-
mates. 22 However, if there is a provision in the contract limiting the
ultimate liability of the municipal corporation, that limitation will be
respected.'-
Counties: A county has the authority to submit a claim asserted by or
against it to arbitration. 24 Furthermore, the county, in its function as a
municipal corporation, may insert provisions for arbitration in its contracts.25
States: Little law has transpired on the arbitration of claims to which
the state is a party. A state holds the immunity of a sovereign from suit,26
contrary to municipal corporations, which have no such immunity.27 The
earlier cases deal with arbitration only under special acts of the legislature.
28
The conclusiveness of an award rendered in an arbitration under such a
special act is doubtful.2 9
The later cases seem to be limited to the state of Pennsylvania, which
has established a state board of arbitration, having jurisdiction to arbitrate
claims against the state arising out of state contracts.30 The courts have
vacated an award of this board3' on the basis of violation of the Pennsyl-
vania Arbitration Statutes32 grounds for vacation.33  Since the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania may not be sued without its consent, 4 and since
the only provision made for the adjudication of contracts disputes to which
the state is a party is through the board of arbitration, it may be assumed
that the provisions of the statute are to be implied into every contract made
with the Commonwealth.
21. Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 711. 563 (1877).
22. Re Rapid Transit Subway Construction Co., 199 App. Diiv. 45. 191 N. Y.
Supp. 383 (1921), Aff'd, without opinion. 233 N.Y. 544, 135 N.E 911 (1922).
23. Canuso v. City of Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, 192 AtI. 133 (1937).
24. Carter v. Krueger & Son, 175 Ky. 399, 194 S.W. 553 (1917).
25. West v. Coos County-Ore.-, 237 Pac. 961, 40 A.L.R. 1362 (1925).
26. Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
27. City of Long Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U. S. 602 (1939).
28. State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7 (1852); Hewitt v. Craig, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 232, 5 S.W.
280 (1887); Jack v. State, 14 Miss. (6 Smedes & M.) 494 (1846); Coxe v. State, 144
N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895); Martin v. State, 51 Wisc. 407, 8 N.W. 248 (1881).
29. State v. Doyle, 38 Wise. 92 (1875) held the act contemplated approval
by another official, which approval was discretionary, and until such approval was secured,
no money could be paid under the award.
30. 72 P.S. 4651-1 et. seq.
31. Seaboard Surety Co. v. Conmnonwealth, 350 Pa. 87, 38 A.2d 58 (1944). See
Kaufman Construction Co. v. Ilolcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534, 174 A.L.R. 189
(1947), where it was held that a court may look to iurisdiction and regularity of the
proceedings even where, as in Pennsylvania, the order of the tribunal is made unap-
pealable (by P.S. § 4651-4, making awards of the board of arbitration unappealable).
32. 5 PA. STAT.
33. 5 PA. STAT. § 170.
34. Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534, 174 A.L.R.
189 (1947).
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111. ARBITRATION AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS INVOLVING
TuE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Case Law to 1953: A leading decision on the validity of arbitration
to which the United States is a party is United States v. Ames.35 The
case arose out of the building of dams by the United States on its land,
and by Ames on his property. Each dam created a flowback which ran
onto the other parties' land. A dispute arose, which was submitted to
arbitration by the United States District Attorney and by Ames, and an
award was had. Subsequently the United States brought this action of
trespass on the case, and the award was set up as a plea in bar. The
court held the award invalid, basing its decision on the rationale 6 that
the judicial power had been vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress might establish, and that it
cannot be vested anywhere else by any department or officer; and therefore,
in the absence of legislative authority, there can be no valid submission
and hence no valid award.
It would seem that if the court's reasoning is correct, and subversion
of the judicial power is the test of validity, there could by the same
reasoning be no valid submission or award in any case triable in a federal
court, since any arbitration and award would be just as much a subversion
of the judicial power as an arbitration by the government or its agents.
That this is not the case is patent. The United States Supreme Court has
held that arbitration is to be encouraged, and that every presumption will
be given to the validity of an award.38 The Court has held that trial by
arbitration, when the parties consent to it, is a method of prosecuting a
suit to judgment as well established and fully warranted by law as a
trial by jury;39 and all of these rulings occur in cases triable in federal
courts.4 Subversion of the judicial power does not seem to be a valid
basis for denial of the power to arbitrate where the United States is a
party.
In Brannen v. United States,41 it was held that an officer of the United
States could not submit a claim to arbitration when he has no jurisdiction
of the claim. However, the question of how far the authority extends
when the officer does have jurisdiction was left open.
35. 1 Woodb. & M. 76, 24 Fed. Cas. 784, No. 14,441 (D. Mass. 1845). It may
be noted that Mr. Charles Woodburv, the court reporter, appears also to have been
counsel for the United States; and the opinion was rendered by Circuit Justice Levi
Woodbury. Just what effect, if any, this had on the decision and the report will be
left to the realistic jurisprudentialists.
36. Ibid. at 789, 790.
37. Burcell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
38. Ibid.
39. Hecker v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, (1865).
40. See notes 37, 38 and 39 supra.
41. 20 Ct. Cl. 219 (1885).
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Benjamin v. United States 2 held that unless officers were authorized
by statute to make awards or allowances, they could not submit the claim
to arbitration. The question raised by this case is whether the officer
may make awards or allowances under authority of statute-can he settle
the case? Or, does the officer have jurisdiction to settle? If he does not
have, then he may not submit the case; ergo, it appears by implication
that if he can settle, he can submit the case to arbitration.
In Welch v. United States,4' the court held that the government
officer in question had no authority to enter into a contract containing
an arbitration clause, that the clause was void, and that since there could
be no valid submission, or even contract, the award was invalid. The
court relies on the present state of the law; but that state is undefined by
either rationale or citation.
Administrative Attitudes: In 1921 the General Accounting office was
created,44 with extensive authority vested in the Comptroller General re-
garding final decisions as to the expenditure of public moneys. Since
government agencies needed the approval of the Comptroller General before
payment, the question of whether or not they could provide for submission
of disputes to arbitration was submitted to him on various occasions. The
answers of various Comptrollers General has been in the negative."5
In 5 Comp. Gen. 417 (1925), it was decided that payment of boards
of arbitration was prohibited unless specifically authorized by Congress, on
the basis that boards of arbitration were included in Section 9 of the Act
of March 4, 1909, 41 and that act required specific authorization before pay-
ment. The same reasoning has been advanced on several other occasions
by the Comptroller General.47 Section 9 has never been construed by a
court; however, Attorney General George W. Wickersham held that it was
not necessary to have specific authorization, but it was enough if the
board were generally authorized by law, noting in a learned opinion the
legislative history of the act.48 Again, Attorney General Wickersham held
that the power to create a board under the act could be implied. 4 It may
be noted that while the General Accounting office has been given the
duty of settling and adjusting all claims and demands whatsoever by or
against the government of the United States,50 this authority has been
judicially limited to money due on contracts,5 ' not including breach of
42. 29 Ct, C1. 417 (1894).
43. 8 Rep. Ct. CI., No. 199, p. 39 (1859).
44. 42 STAT. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 41-60 (1952).
45. 19 Cowqp. CrN. 700 (1940); 8 CoMP. GEN. 96 (1928); 6 Co.ur. GE. 140(1926); 5 COMP. GEN. 417 (1925).
46. 35 STAT, 1027 (1909), 31 U.S.C. § 673 (1952).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. 27 Ors. Arr'Y GEN. 432 (1909).
49. 27 Os. ATT'Y GEN. 437 (1909).
50. 42 STAT. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. 71 (1952).
51. U.S. ex rel Coates v. St. Louis Clay Products Co., 68 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Mo.
1946).
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contracts or tort claims. " Furthermore, the power does not apply to judg-
ments of the Court of Claims. 5 3 In fact, the scope of action of the
Comptroller General and the General Accounting office seems to be re-
stricted to that of auditors, 4 and their activities leave unimpaired a judicial
remedy.55 It has been held that a plaintiff was entitled to recover despite
the wishes and actions of the Comptroller General where the Comptroller
General was not a party to the contract, and the contract was a valid one. 6
In 33 Op. AT'T'Y GEN. 160 (1922), Attorney General Daugherty gives
his opinion that when government officers are authorized by statute to fix
the price of sale of government property, at their discretion, they have
no authority to submit to arbitration because that would be a surrender
of their authority to fix the price. The learned Attorney General does not
discuss the reason why the submission is not an exercise of the discretionary
power conferred.
Immunity From Suit as an Objection: Turning now to the problem
of the immunity of the sovereign from suit57 as an objection to the validity
of arbitration provisions and arbitrations, it is settled that if the United
States consents to the suit an action will lie;5 8 however, the United States
.may prescribe the terms and conditions under which it may be sued.50
Assuming that consent to an attempted recovery has been given, no reason
appears to bar arbitration of the dispute. If it be true that only one court-
pro exempla, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of the suit in question,
that fact may be no less true in any suit between any parties, and should
not militate against the validity of arbitration or arbitration clauses in
contracts. If we assume a diversity of citizenship case between two private
citizens, falling only in the jurisdiction of the United States District
Court, 0 it would obviously not be contended that the cause could not be
arbitrated. The fact that a particular tribunal is established for the litigation
of certain claims would not appear to prevent the arbitration of those
claims.
Connected with this problem is the question of the limitation of
liability on the part of the United States which may be contained in the
consent.0 ' Assuming such a limitation of liability to be extant, it seems
that it would be implied into the contract just as effectively when the
dispute is being arbitrated as when it is being tried in a court. Naturally,
52. Ibid.
53. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886).
51. Sowle v. United States, 38 Ct. CL. 525 (1903).
55. Ibid.
56. J. 11. Mathis & Co. v, United States, 79 F. Supp. 703 (D. N.J. 1948).
57. United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
58. Ibid.
59. Young v. United States, 95 U.S. 641 (1877).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
61. Geo. H. Evans & Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 500 (3rd Cir. 1948), granting
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where the claim was greater than the concession
of liability under the enabling act.
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the limitation of liability will apply to an arbitration award; and it will
be remembered that limitations of liability under the contract by a mere
municipal corporation will be enforced. 2
The Principle of Statutory Grant: Regarding the principle of statutory
grant implied in the Ames case, 'e :I that Congress may by statute authorize
arbitration of claims by the government or government agencies, this
principle was acted upon by Congress in the Contract Settlement Act of
1944,4 which provided for the arbitration of disputes without regard to
the amount in controversy . 5 Probably the enactment of legislation on the
general ability to arbitrate would be the best solution to the problem.
The Federal Agency as a Corporate Body: It appears that at least
some federal corporations are not to be placed on the same footing as
other government agencies in regard to the question of arbitration pro-
visions in contracts. Many of these corporations are given the right to sue
and be sued in their charters; 0 it has been held that in the absence of
express grant the capacity to sue and be sued may be implied, 7 and that
the United States may shed its sovereign immunity by becoming a cor-
porator."8 The power is implied very readily where the corporation has
the characteristics of a private corporation, In those federal corporations
where the power to sue and be sued exists, if not in all such corporations,
it seems no problem will arise as to the validity of a provision for arbitration
in a procurement contract; it should be treated precisely as if the corporation
were a private corporation; and arbitration clauses in procurement contracts
executed by federal corporations have in fact been upheld.7 0
Case Law: A Modern View: In Grant v. United States71 the court
of claims considered the validity of an arbitration made under a provision in
a government procurement contract. In this case, the plaintiff, Grant,
contended that the arbitration clause was void, relying on the Ames72 and
Welch', cases. The court held the arbitration provision valid,74 on the
62. Canuso v. City of Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, 192 At. 133 (1937).
63. United States v. Ames, 1 Woodb. & NI. 76, 24 Fed. Cas. 784, No. 14,441
(D. Mass. 1845).
64. 58 STAT. 647 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1952).
65. 58 STAT. 660 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 113 (e) (1952).
66. Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381 (1939); Federal Land Bank v. Priddy,
295 U.S. 229 (1934), reh. den. 295 U.S. 769 (1934); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United
States Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1921).
67. Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
68. Bank of United States v. Planters Bank, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
69. Casper v. Regional Agricultural Credit Corp., 202 Minn. 433, 278 N.W. 896
(1938).
70. Application of RFC, 106 F. Supp, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 366
(2nd Cir. 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 854 (1953).
71. 124 Ct. C1. 202, 109 F. Supp. 215 (1953).
72. See note 63 supra.
73. Welch v. United States, 8 Rep. Ct. C1. No. 199, p. 39 (1859).
74. 124 Ct. Cl. at 207, 109 F. Supp. at 247.
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rationalc that the United States Supreme Court has held determination
clauses valid,70 and that those clauses were a ". . . sort of arbitration . . .,77
which violated as completely as any "real" arbitration the doctrine of the
Ames case,78 that of subversion of the judicial power as a bar to the
authority to arbitrate. The court held that a request for arbitration by
the plaintiff was a condition precedent to bringing suit.7" The rationale
seems valid.
Power to Submit or to Make Contract: Attorney: Under the U. S.
rule, an attorney may submit his client's cause to arbitration, that being
one form of trial.80 It is submitted that this power should apply to the
United States Attorney.
Agent: The general rule is that an agent may not submit a claim
to arbitration, or, impliedly, contract therefor81 However, as the Grant82
case implies, the federal agency and agent are not to be included in the
general rule, on the basis of the validity of the determination clauses, 3
and the fact that they may be treated as conclusive.8 4
V. CONCLUSION
The Grant case5 is a beacon to both the contractors engaged in
supplying the tremendous needs of our federal government, and to that
government's agencies and officers. It offers the prospect of a speedy, in-
expensive, impartial determination of disputes, without the bitterness and
suspicion attendant on the judgment of a cause by an interested party, or
the prospect of years of waiting on a court calendar. Socially accepted,
morally justified, legally rational, it appears that arbitration provisions in
government procurement contracts have a bright future. Arbitrium est
judicium boni viri, secundum aequum et bonum.86
SHan STEPHEN FiE
75. See discussion, Introduction, supra.
76. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); United States v. Moormian,
338 U.S. 256 (1949)
77. 124 Ct. CI. a 207, 109 F. Stpp. at 247.
78. See note 63 supra.
79. See note 77 s-upra.80. Holker v. Parker, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 436 (1813); Abbe v. Rood, 1 Fed. Cas. 7,No. 6. (D. Mich. 1854); Denny v. Brown, 7 Fed. Cas. 490, No. 3,805 (S.D.N.Y. 1844).
81. California Lima Bean Growers Ass'n v. Mankowitz, 9 N.J. Misc. 362, 154 Atl.
532 (1931).
82. Grant v. United States, 124 Ct. C1. 274, 109 F. Supp. 245 (1953).
83. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
84. Ross Engineering Co. v. Pace, 153 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1946); P. 11. McLaughlin
& Co. v. United States, 36 Ct. C1. 138 (1901).
85. See note 82 supra.
86. Berry v. Perry, 3 Bulst. 62 at 64, 81 Eng. Rep. 54 at 55 (1626).
